Consideraciones sobre algunos modelos de explicación científica

Abstract

Comments on some models of scientific explanation. The case of the explanation of intentional action in social and human sciences. Empirical sciences advance explanations of facts or  articular phenomena but also of laws and theories. C. Hempel, P. Oppenheim, K. Popper and others systematized the meta-theo retical concept of scientific explanation in terms of what is known as the "nomological-deductive model" (or "covering law model"). In this paper I intend to show some of the limitations of this model, discuss the possibility of extending it to explain the intentional actions of social agents —very frequent in social and human sciences— and analyze other possibilities to explain those actions, in particular, von Wright's practical syllogism and Donald Davison'smodel of intentional causal explanation that ad vocates the possibility of explaining causally intentional acts in terms of causal relations that can be subsumed under strict laws.

Keywords:

Nomológico-deductivo

expli- cación causal

explicación intencional

silogismo práctico

acciones intencionales

razones

Nomological deductive

causal explanation

intentional explanation

practical syllogism

intentional actions

reasons

References

Sin referencias bibliográficas