Resumen
El artículo muestra la forma en que la epistemología de las virtudes puede resolver algunos de los problemas epistemológicos clásicos, y la manera en que puede lograrse una concepción integrada de las variantes confiabilista y responsabilista de la epistemología de las virtudes.
Citas
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