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Flórez Quintero, D. T. . (2018). ¿Es el no-conceptualismo una forma del mito de lo dado? . Discusiones Filosóficas, 19(33), 57–70. https://doi.org/10.17151/difil.2018.19.33.5
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En este artículo examino si el noconceptualismo es una forma del Mito de lo Dado y argumento que las percepciones, incluso si su contenido es no-conceptual, pertenecen al ‘espacio de las razones’. Defenderé la tesis de que las experiencias perceptuales pertenecen legítimamente al espacio lógico de las razones syss satisfacen las siguientes tres condiciones (i) tienen contenido semántico, (ii) están gobernadas por reglas, y (iii) tienen unas propiedades tales que por su naturaleza se podría decir que cuando una experiencia perceptual las satisface, constituye una razón para creer algo.
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---. Content, Conceptual Content, and Nonconceptual Content. En: Essays on Nonconceptual Content. Gunther. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2002. Print.
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Heck, Richard. “Nonconceptual Content and the "Space of Reasons"”. The Philosophical Review 109.4 (2000): 483-523. Web.
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---. Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994. Print.
Sellars, Wilfrid. “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”. Minessota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1 (1956): 253-329. Web.
