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Fecha Publicación: 2008-01-01
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Molinet, J. (2008). Teoría de la elección social: Funciones de bienestar social y mecanismos de ejecución. Kenneth J. Arrow y Leonid Hurwicz. Jurídicas, 5(1), 57–93. Recuperado a partir de https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/juridicas/article/view/5651
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Habitamos un mundo dividido en Estados, donde los Estados han sido constituidos por individuos. Hay algunos de estos Estados donde las elecciones sociales dependerían explícitamente de las elecciones individuales. En estos Estados, que son los nuestros, hay dos problemas mayores: ¿Cómo están conectadas las elecciones individuales con las elecciones sociales? y ¿cómo poner en práctica las elecciones sociales obtenidas? Por ejemplo, vía la regla de mayoría, una sociedad escoge un proyecto de bienestar. Enseguida, vía la división de poderes, los niveles de gobierno y la organización propia del mismo gobierno, las políticas correspondientes, quedan asociadas con mecanismos particulares que han de ejecutarlas. En ambos niveles, existen disposiciones que obligan a escoger colectivamente las metas y las maneras de conseguirlas. En este horizonte, se iniciará con el examen preliminar de algunos temas en ambos niveles para delimitar una versión amplia de la teoría de la elección social. Algunos ejemplos, en este mismo nivel preliminar, sugerirán la extensión de la teoría.
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SCHOFIELD, Nicholas. (1983). Generic Instability of Majority Rule. New York: Review of Economic Studies Nº 50.
SHEPSLE, Kenneth & WEINGAST, Barry. (1982). Institutionalizing Majority Rule: A social choice theory with policy implications. New York: American Economic Review Nº 72.
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VICKREY, William. (1960). Utility, Strategy, and Social Decision Rules. New York: Quarterly Journal of Economics Nº 74.
WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig. (1994). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Madrid: Editorial Trotta.
AMADAE, Sonja. (2003). Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: The Cold War Origins of Rational Choice Liberalism. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
ARROW, Kenneth. (1963). Social Choice and Individual Values. Cowles Foundation Monograph, 12. London: Yale University Press.
______. (1983). Social Choice and Justice. Collected Papers of Kenneth Arrow, Vol. 1. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
______ & HURWICZ. (1977). Studies in Resource Allocation Processes. New York: Cambridge University Press.
BADIE, Bertrand. (1992). L´État Importé. Essai sur l´occidentalisation de l´ordre politique. Paris: Fayard.
BRETON, Le & WEYMARK, John. (1996). An Introduction to Arrovian Social Welfare Functions and Political Domains. Collective Decision-Making: Social Choice and Political Economy. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
CREVELD, Martin Van. (1999). The Rise and Decline of the State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
DANILOV, Vladimir & SOTSKOV, Alexander. (2002). Social Choice Mechanisms. Berlin: Springer Verlag.
DUMMETT, Michael & FARQUHARSON, Robin. (1961). “Stability in Voting”. En: Econometrica Nº 29. New York: New York University Press.
GAERTNER, Wulf. (2006). A Primer in Social Choice Theory. New York: Oxford University Press.
GIBBARD, Allan. (1973). “Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result”. En: Econometrica Nº 41. New York: New York University Press.
______. (1977). “Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance”. En: Econometrica Nº 45. New York: New York University Press.
HAYEK, Friedrich August Von. (1945). The Use of Knowledge in Society. New York: American Economic Review.
HURWICZ, Leonid. (1969). On the Concept and Possibility of Informational Decentralization. New York: American Economic Review.
______. (1986). On Implementation of Social Choice Rules in Irrational Societies. Social Choice and Public Decision Making (Essays in Honor of Kenneth Arrow, Vol. I). New York: Cambridge University Press.
______. (1993). Implementation and enforcement in institutional modelling. Political Economy: Institutions, competition, and representation. Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics. Edited by W.A. Barnett, M.J. Hinich & N. Schofield New York: Cambridge University Press.
______ & REITER, Stanley. (2006). Designing Economic Mechanisms. New York: Cambridge University Press.
KRUEGER, Anne. (1998). ¿Whither the World Bank and the IMF? New York: Journal of Economic Literature.
LYONS, Gene & MASTANDUNO, Michael. (1995). ¿Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
MARSCHAK, Jacob. (1955). Elements for a Theory of Teams. University of Chicago: Management Science Nº 1.
MCGUIRE & OLSON. (1996). The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The invisible hand and the use of force. New York: Journal of Economic Literature.
MCKELVEY, Richard. (1979). “General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models”. En: Econometrica Nº 47. New York: New York University Press.
______ & SCHOFIELD, Norman. (1987). “Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point”. En: Econometrica Nº 55. New York: New York University Press.
MILLER, Norman. (1995). “Committees, Agendas, and Voting”. En: Fundamentals of Pure and Applied Economics Nº 58. Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers.
MOULIN, Harve. (1994). Social Choice Theory. Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. 2. North-Holland: Handbooks in Economics Nº 19. New York: New York University Press.
PALFREY, Tomas. (2001). Implementation Theory. Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. 3. North-Holland: Handbooks in Economics Nº 19. New York: New York University Press.
RENY, Philip. (2001). Arrow’s theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a unified approach. New York: Economic Letters.
RIKER, William. (1984). The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making: The Presidency in 1787 with Comments on Determinism and Rational Choice. New York: American Political Science Review Nº 78.
SCHMITT, Carl. (1979). The Tyranny of Values. London: Plutarch Press.
SCHMEIDLER, David. (1980). “Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions”. En: Econometrica Nº 48. New York: New York University Press.
SCHOFIELD, Nicholas. (1983). Generic Instability of Majority Rule. New York: Review of Economic Studies Nº 50.
SHEPSLE, Kenneth & WEINGAST, Barry. (1982). Institutionalizing Majority Rule: A social choice theory with policy implications. New York: American Economic Review Nº 72.
SPINOZA, Baruch. (2000). Ética demostrada según el orden geométrico. Madrid: Editorial Trotta.
VICKREY, William. (1960). Utility, Strategy, and Social Decision Rules. New York: Quarterly Journal of Economics Nº 74.
WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig. (1994). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Madrid: Editorial Trotta.
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